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The paper presents a formal study of how risk aversion can be applied to analysis of
international trade. It seeks to illustrate, amongst other things, that risk-averse firms
operating in perfectly competitive markets with uncertainty of demand tend to diversify
markets and that this provides the basis for international trade in identical commodities
between identical countries. The paper argues that such trade may be welfare-improving,
despite efficiency losses due to cross-hauling and transportation costs. Moreover, the
analysis  shows  that  reduction  of  tariff  per  unit  of  imported  goods  (e.g.,  due  to  the
organization of custom unions) increases trade flows but does not necessarily improve
total welfare. Therefore, in some particular cases, the use of sophisticated government
intervention can lead to better outcomes than can free trade.
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Casual observation would lead one to conclude that a large part of international trade
(called  intra-industry  trade)  cannot  be  fully  explained  by  classical  trade  theory.  The
growing share of such trade in world markets needs explaining. The introduction of
product differentiation and economies of scale assumptions into trade models provides 
a partial answer. The presence of economies of scale creates incentives for countries to
specialize in the production of a small number of differentiated products and therefore
naturally leads towards intra-industry trade (see Grubel and Lloyd, 1975; Helpman 1983;
Krugman, 1979, 1980, 1995), but it is also at the root of imperfectly competitive markets.
"New"  trade  theory  starts  from  these  new  assumptions  (imperfect  competition,
economies of scale and differentiated goods), and identifies new gains from international
trade (see e.g., Brander, 1981; Venebles and Smith, 1986; Hwang and Schulman, 1992).
The intuition is simple: by creating larger and more competitive markets within a single
industry, trade reduces the distortions associated with imperfect competition in a closed
economy. Based on these assumptions, Brander (1981) shows that there are reasons to
expect two-way trade even in identical products, due to strategic interactions among
firms operating in non competitive markets. What is not so widely recognized is that
there are reasons to expect international trade in identical commodities (i.e., within 
a single industry) even if markets are perfectly competitive. This paper is, then, intended
to contribute to the theory of trade between similar or even identical countries (such as
trade within the European Union). In particular, countries in the model are assumed to
be identical and trade patterns are determined by the interaction of demand uncertainty,
risk aversion and the perfectly competitive behavior of firms. 
One should note that the paper's basic area of reference, risk reduction via market
diversification, is well established in international capital markets and is known as the
theory of portfolio choice with risk aversion. The originator of the theory – James Tobin
– described its fundamental concept as: "Not putting all the eggs in one basket". This
paper,  however,  explicitly  introduces  transportation  costs,  and  interprets  the  model
within  the  framework  of  international  trade.  In  particular,  we  show  that  when
transportation costs are small enough and an economy is open to international trade,
producers can reduce the risk they face by placing some "eggs" in additional foreign
"basket(s)". This reduction in risk is a new motive for international exchange. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the trade model. Section 3
characterizes  international  exchange  in  free  trade  equilibrium.  This  is  followed  by 
a discussion of both autarky and free trade equilibrium in Section 4. The Welfare effects
6
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effects of tariff reductions (e.g. due to integration with a common market) are discussed.
Finally, Section 5 summarizes the results and posits some conclusions.
2. The Model
2.1. Markets
Let us suppose that there are two identical countries: Home country and Foreign
country. In each country a single commodity can be produced and supplied to perfectly
competitive, separated, markets. The countries are identical, but in both of them there
is uncertainty about market demand. We assume that two states of nature (S1 and S2) can
occur independently in each country. In particular, we assume that in each country the
probability of state S1 is q, and the probability of state S2 is 1-q. Market demand in each
particular state is assumed to be identical in both countries, and in the analysis which
follows inverse market demands at state S1 and S2 are denoted correspondingly as
D-1(X)+λ  and D-1(X)-λ  ( λ>0,  dD-1(X) / dX<0), where X(X≥0 ) is the total quantity supplied
to the market.
2.2. Firms
The cost function of any firm in the model is given as
(1)
where TC is a total cost, x and xo denote correspondingly the volume of output supplied
to the domestic market and exported (x, xo ≥ 0), and C denotes constant marginal cost (no
fixed cost is assumed). Transport costs are borne by producers. The per unit transport
cost equals t (t>0) and is the same in both directions. 
In an uncertain world, we assume that any decision on the volume of output to be
produced must be taken prior to the sales date, at which actual market demand is
known. The firm´s beliefs about market demand are given by the probabilities of state
S1 and S2. The firm is assumed to be unable to influence this distribution (i.e., to be
able  to  predict  market  demand).  Moreover,  we  assume  that  firms  are  managed
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) ( ) (
o o x x C x x TC + = +according to the wishes of their owners who are typical asset holders, and that the
decisions in each firm are made by a group of decision-makers with sufficiently similar
preferences to guarantee the existence of a group-preference function, representable
by a von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function1. Given these conditions we assume risk
aversion, so that the utility function of each firm (U) is strictly concave and twice the
differentiable function of profits2.
2.3. Individual Output Decisions
For the sake of clarity we assume that each firm makes its output decisions with sole
regard for short-run profits and does not consider the relationship between this output
policy and long-term investment and finance policies (a more complete model would
make it necessary to draw up a much larger and more detailed list of assumptions about
the economic environment of the firm than is needed for the purposes of this paper).
Each firm takes the market prices in each particular state as given and must decide
(before the real market price is known) how much of the commodity to produce for
domestic consumption and how much to export. Thus, the profit of the firm equals:
,  (2)
if state S1 occurs in both countries; 
,  (3)
if state S1 occurs in the home country and state S2 occurs in the foreign country;
,  (4)
if state S2 occurs in the home country and state S1 occurs in the foreign country;
(5)
if state S2 occurs in both countries (to simplify the notation we will skip the arguments
8
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1 See Sandmo (1971) for discussion. 
2 Sandmo (1971) and Leland (1972) provide detailed justifications for this assumption. 
o o o o tx x x C x P x P x x − + − + + + = ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( 1 λ λ π
o o o o tx x x C x P x P x x − + − − + + = ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( 2 λ λ π
o o o o tx x x C x P x P x x − + − + + − = ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( 3 λ λ π
o o o o tx x x C x P x P x x − + − − + − = ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( 4 λ λ π(x, xo) when referring to the profit functions specified above). Taking the above into
account, the firm takes prices as given and maximizes expected utility from profit:
(6)
with respect to x and xo (x, xo≥ 0). Since for risk averse utility function (i.e., U´(π )>0 and
U´ ´ (π )<0) the objective function (6) is strictly concave for any x and xo (x, xo≥ 0), there
exists a single pair (     ,      ) for which the objective function is maximized3.
2.4. Industry
Industry  in  both  countries  is  competitive.  Given  that  uncertainty  of  demand  in
competitive equilibrium means that there is a finite number of risk averse firms (N)
operating in the market4, total volume of output supplied to the market of any country
can be represented as
.  (7)
Taking into account that the total volume of output supplied depends on the number
of firms in the given industry (N), expected equilibrium market prices also depend on N
(i.e., P= P(N) ), and consequently, an equilibrium volume of output supplied to the market
by each individual firm can be considered as a function of N, i.e.,          and         . The
number of firms in the industry N is determined by free entry and exit, such that in
equilibrium the expected utility from being in the industry is equal to the expected utility
of some benchmark activity b (b>0). This yields the industry equilibrium condition5
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3 Note that for any pairs (x1, x1
o) and (x2, x2
o) , such that (x1, x1
o) ≠ (x2, x2
o), and x1, x2, x1
o x2
o≥  0, and for any
γ ∈  (0,1), 
, and, therefore
>
due to strict concavity of the utility function. Since E{U[π (x, xo)]} is a linear combination of U[π i (x, xo)] , where
i=1,2,3,4; E{U[π (x, xo)]} is also strictly concave function of x, xo (x, xo≥  0).  
4 See Ghosal (1996) for empirical evidence.
5 See Appelbaum and Katz (1986).
) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ] ) 1 ( , ) 1 ( [ 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1
o o o o x x x x x x x x i i i π γ γπ γ γ γ γ π − + = − + − +
)] , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( [ ]} ) 1 ( , ) 1 ( [ { 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1
o o o o o x x x x U x x x x U i i i π γ γπ γ γ γ γ π − + = − + − +
)] , ( [ ) 1 ( )] , ( [ 2 2 1 1
o o x x U x x U i i π γ π γ − + >
)] ( ~ ) ( ~ [ ) (
~
P x P x N P X
o + ⋅ =
) ( ~ N x ) ( ~ N x
o
x ~ o x ~.  (8)
3. International Exchange
Below we present the basic proposition of the paper, which states that under demand
uncertainty  international  trade  in  identical  commodities  between  two  separate,
statistically identical and perfectly competitive, markets can be observed.
PROPOSITION 1. Market equilibrium involves trade in spite of the fact that both
countries produce exactly the same commodity in perfectly competitive environments,
and there is an obvious loss due to transportation costs.
Proof. Suppose the total equilibrium volume of output supplied to the market is
positive i.e.,          , then an equilibrium output of a single firm                                   is
also positive (            ). Representing                     , substituting into (2)-(5) and differentiating
(6) with respect to x, we get
. (9)
Note that                               . Consequently,                                         and
, for  x = 0  and           . Therefore, the pair (x = 0,            ) cannot be
optimal, since for any small            , the pair (           ,                    ) gives a higher expected
utility level. On the other hand,                                      . Consequently, for          and
,                                        and for sufficiently small t,                            . Therefore,
for sufficiently small t the pair (             ,             ) cannot be optimal, since there exists
such a pair (                  ,            ), where            , for which the value of the objective
function is higher. 
Thus, we conclude that for sufficiently small t each firm supplies to both markets (i.e.,  
and            ). This means that if transportation costs are small enough, equilibrium
10
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o xin a market with uncertain demand involves international trade despite the fact that both
countries produce exactly the same commodity in perfectly competitive environments,
and there is an obvious loss due to transportation costs. If countries are identical, the
situation in the foreign country is symmetric to that in the home country, i.e., the firm
located in the home country exports to the foreign country and produces for its domestic
market, while the firm in the foreign country exports to the home country and produces
for its domestic market. 
4. Autarky vs. Free Trade
We can now proceed to compare equilibrium in a closed economy with free trade
equilibrium. In autarky, a single risk-averse firm takes prices as given and maximizes (with





denote profits of the firm in state S1 and S2, respectively. Since for the risk-averse utility
function (i.e., U´(π )>0 and U´´( π )<0)  the objective function (10) is strictly concave, for
any x (x≥ 0), there exists a single xA for which this function is maximized. Taking into
account that under uncertainty of demand in competitive equilibrium there is a finite
number of risk-averse firms (N) operating in the market, the total volume of output
supplied to the market can be represented as NxA(P). Since the total volume of output
supplied depends on the number of firms in the industry (N) the expected equilibrium
market price (PA) also depends on N (i.e., PA=PA(N)), and consequently, an equilibrium
volume of output supplied to the market by each individual firm can be considered as 
a function of N, i.e., xA(N) . The number of firms in industry N is determined by free entry
and exit, such that, in equilibrium the expected utility from being in the industry is equal
to the expected utility of some benchmark activity b (b>0). This yields the industry
equilibrium condition                                       .
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) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )] ( [ 2 1 A A U q qU U E π π π − + ≡
Cx x P A − + = ) ( 1 λ π
Cx x P A − − = ) ( 2 λ π
0 ))]} ( ( [ { = − b P x U E A A πThe  proposition  below  compares  the  basic  characteristics  of  the  market  under
consideration in autarky and free trade equilibrium conditions.
PROPOSITION 2. Under uncertainty of demand total free trade volume of output
supplied to the market is always greater than it would be in an autarky regime and the
expected market price under free trade is smaller than it would be under autarky.
Proof. Let PA and xA (PA, xA>0) denote, respectively, the expected equilibrium market
price  and  equilibrium  output  of  a  single  firm  under  autarky.  Suppose  now  that
international trade is allowed. Assume that the free trade market price P equals to PA, and
consider the single firm's volume of output supplied to the home market x (x≥ 0) and to
the foreign market  xo (xo≥ 0), such that x + xo = xA . Setting  xo = xA - x and substituting
into (2)-(5) yields
12
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Figure 1. Autarky equilibrium6 (NA denotes an equilibrium number of firms)
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Plugging (13)-(16) into (6), and differentiating it with respect to x, we get:
(17)
Since π 2(x=xA)>π 3(x=xA) (see (14) and (15)), it follows from the expression above 
that for sufficiently small value of per unit transportation cost t:                           . Therefore, 
for some x<xA , xo=xA-x (x ≥  0 and xo ≥ 0), the value of the objective function (6) is
greater than for x=xA and xo=0 . Note, that the value of the objective function (6) at
P=PA, x=xA and xo=0 is equal to the value of the expected utility function specified by
expression (10) at P=PA and x=xA. Therefore, if the value of the objective function of a
single firm at P=PA and  x=xA and xo=0 equals b, then the value of the objective function
of this firm at P=PA and x<xA, and  xo = xA-x is greater than b. Consequently, under free
trade expected equilibrium price     has to be lower than the expected equilibrium price
under autarky PA. This can happen, however, only if the total equilibrium output supplied
to the market under the free trade regime is greater then under autarky (Figure 2). 
5. Welfare Effects
This  section  discusses  the  impact  of  intra-industry  trade  in  separated,  perfectly
competitive markets on overall welfare. Since international trade can be observed only if
transportation  costs  do  not  exceed  a  certain  level  and  a  further  decrease  in
transportation costs increases trade flows, we focus on the impact of the change in
transportation  costs  on  the  expected  total  welfare  defined  as  a  sum  of  expected
consumer and producer surplus. 
Consumer surplus. Consumer surplus measures the amount a consumer gains from
a purchase by the difference between the price he actually pays and the price he would
have been willing to pay. Thus, expected consumer surplus equals:
13
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Taking derivative of (18) with respect to t (at          , where     denotes expected
equilibrium market price), we get:
.  (19)
The equilibrium values:      ,      and      , satisfy the following conditions:
,  (20)
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Figure 2. Free trade equilibrium7
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,  (21)
.  (22)
Consider the equilibrium values      ,      and     as functions of t and differentiate (22)
with respect to t. Obviously, 
.  (23)










Therefore, the expected consumer surplus falls if transportation costs increase.
Producer surplus. Analogous to the concept of expected consumer surplus is that of
expected producer surplus, which is understood as expected aggregate profit of the
industry.
Let                 , for i=1,2,...,4. In equilibrium the expected producer surplus is
determined as
.  (29)
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.  (30)
Since                         ,
.  (31)
Taking into account that                   , differentiating and rearranging we get:
.  (32)
Taking into account (2-5) and rearranging we have:
. (33)
Differentiating (33) with respect to t, and rearranging taking into account (24) we get:   
. (34)
Finally, the change of the expected producer surplus with response to change in
transportation costs can be represented as
.  (35)
where          is given by (33). Thus, the pattern of changes in the expected producer
surplus in response to changes in transportation costs, depends on the shape of demand
curve. In particular, expected producer surplus falls as transportation costs increase if 
,  (36)
i.e., if 
(a) market demand is very elastic (the inverse demand curve is flat),
or/and
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o(b) per unit transportation costs are negligible (t is close to zero).
Total effect. Under free trade expected welfare is the sum of expected consumer
and producer surplus. Consequently, the change in total expected welfare in response to
changes in transportation costs is determined as 
.  (37)
Thus, total expected welfare decreases if transportation costs increase if
,  (38)
i.e., if 
(a) market demand is very elastic (the inverse demand curve is flat),
or/and
(b) per unit transportation costs are negligible (t is close to zero).
It follows from the above analysis that decreases in transportation costs, which allows
countries to extend international exchange, improves expected total welfare if market
demand is elastic enough, and decreases expected total welfare in the opposite case.
6. Trade Policy and Intra-industry Trade in Perfectly Competitive
Markets
This  section  provides  a  background  for  understanding  the  effects  of  the  most
important instrument of trade policy in the framework of intra-industry trade in perfectly
competitive markets. In the analysis which follows we focus on the welfare effects of
tariffs – the oldest and the simplest trade policy instrument – since an understanding of
the effects of a tariffs remains a vital basis for understanding other trade policies.
Taking into account that per unit transportation costs were assumed to be equal to t
(t>0) the effect of the change in transportation costs is identical, as the effect of a change
in specific tariffs, i.e., tariffs levied as a fixed charge for each unit of goods imported.
Assuming that the countries analyzed are statistically identical (the situation is symmetric,
i.e., if one country imposes tariffs the other one does the same), the expected total
welfare equals the sum of expected consumer surplus, producer surplus and revenue
from tariffs, less losses associated with transportation.
17































P D E x P
dP
dD
x x x x
x











( ] ~ [ ~ )
~
(















































oIf transportation costs are negligible (t=0) then a decrease in tariff per unit increases
the volume of trade, and consequently, the total volume of output supplied to the market.
It  decreases  expected  deadweight  loss  and  improves  expected  total  welfare.  If
transportation costs are significant, but international exchange still takes place, then the
impact of tariffs cannot be unambiguously determined. In particular, the overall effect
depends on the relationship between the change in the sum of expected consumer
surplus, expected producer surplus and revenue from tariffs, and the change in losses
18
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Figure 3. Welfare effects of tariff reduction (t – unit transportation cost, T1 – initial tariff




















A+C: Increase in expected consumer surplus,
E-B: Increase in tariff revenue,
D+B-A: Increase in expected producer surplus,
F: Increase in total transportation cost.
8 For the sake of clarity linear demand is considered.19
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associated with transportation (see Figure 3). Obviously, if additional transportation costs
(area F in Figure 3) exceed total expected gains from tariff reduction (in Figure 3 area:
C+D+E) then the overall welfare effect of tariff reduction is negative (i.e., tariffs are
welfare improving), otherwise a reduction in tariff increases expected overall welfare.
Consequently,  in  the  case  of  intra-industry  trade  in  perfectly  competitive  markets  a
reduction of tariff per unit of good imported (or free trade) does not necessarily improve
overall  welfare.  Therefore,  in  some  cases  the  use  of  sophisticated  government
intervention can lead to better outcomes than free trade.
7. Conclusion
The above analysis illustrates that there is some justification for international trade in
identical  goods  even  if  markets  are  perfectly  competitive.  International  exchange  of
identical  commodities  (cross-hauling)  occurs  due  to  the  fact  that  risk-averse  firms
operating in separated and perfectly competitive markets with price uncertainty tend to
diversify  markets.  If  transportation  costs  are  small  enough  this  gives  a  basis  for
international  trade  even  between  identical  countries.  This  is  a  view  of  trade  which
appears to be useful in understanding trade among industrialized countries. 
The basic idea of the paper: risk reduction by market diversification has been adopted
from a theory of portfolio choice with risk aversion. However, in the model above we
have  introduced  transportation  costs  explicitly  and  we  interpret  it  as  a  model  of
international trade (we should note, however, that the result would be similar if each risk-
averse firm operated a plant in the home country and a higher cost plant in a foreign
country, without trade taking place). The paper demonstrates that if firms act in each
competitive market separately, international trade in identical commodities can arise and
also, that such trade may improve welfare (even despite the existence of cross-hauling,
which is obviously inefficient due to costly transportation). 
The brief analysis of basic trade policy presented in the paper shows that in the case
of intra-industry trade in perfectly competitive markets tariff reduction (or free trade)
does not necessarily improve total welfare (it has to be recognized, however, that if
transportation costs are negligible tariffs are never welfare improving). Therefore, in
some cases, the use of sophisticated government intervention can led to better outcomes
than free trade (similar to trade in oligopolistic industries). 
Finally, we should stress that the present paper only indicates the possibility and some
characteristics of international trade based on the interaction of demand uncertainty, risk20
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aversion and perfectly competitive behavior of firms. In order to present this idea we
have focused on the simplest case (two identical countries) and tariffs as a basic policy
instrument. We have said nothing about asymmetric cases (e.g., countries with identical
tastes but of different sizes) and other policy instruments, but detail analysis of these and
other issues is left for further research. 
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